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GATT AND NAFTA: MARRYING
EFFECTIVE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE FIFTY STATES
SAMUEL C. STRAIGHT
[T]he sovereignty issue is a red herring.... [I]f our rights are
being trampled we are going to be able to fix it.'
INTRODUCTION
In 1776, Adam Smith admonished the world that "[t]he most
effectual expedient ... for raising the value of ... surplus
pro[]duce, for encouraging its increase... would be to allow the
most perfect freedom to the trade of all such mercantile nations."2
Since that time, international trade has reached immense propor-
tions as nations increasingly depend on formal and reliable free
trade regimes.' By virtue of its huge import market and strong
export industries, the United States remains at the center of global
trade.4 With the ever increasing complexity and prevalence of
international trade, binding trade agreements such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATr)5 and the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 6 will play a vital role in the
1. 140 CONG. REc. S15,342 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole).
2. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 670 (R. H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976) (1776) (describing the advantages of
free trade for landed nations).
3. There are 97 preferential trade agreements between various nations established
under Article XXIV of GATT, including the European Economic Community, the Af-
rican Common Market, the Latin America Free Trade Association, and the Israel-United
States Free Trade Agreement. GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND
PRACTICE 797-08 (6th ed. 1994) [hereinafter GATT Index].
4. See PATRICK Low, TRADING FREE: THE GATT AND US TRADE POLICY 10-11
(1993) ("In the twenty-eight years from 1960 to 1988, for example, the share of imports
in U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 4.7 percent to 9.7 percent (in constant
dollars). Over the same period, the export share in U.S. GDP rose from 5.2 percent to
11.4 percent.") (citation omitted).
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. pts. 5-6, at A5, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (1952) [hereinafter GATT 1947]. The current
amended version of the GATT appears at 4 GATT BISD 1 (1969).
6. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
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legal relationships between the United States and its trading part-
ners.
While scholars of jurisprudence may debate the necessity of
efficacious application of law in any legal system,7 critics of the
international legal system regularly cite its lack of effective dispute
settlement and enforcement mechanisms as a major shortcoming.8
In the area of international trade, nations have recognized the
importance of maintaining a stable economic system and have had
varying degrees of success in adopting legal structures to ensure
trade stability.' GAIT and NAFrA represent significant progress
toward enhancing international economic welfare through binding
legal obligations. However, a tension persists between international
legal obligations like GATT? and NAFTA and domestic jurisdiction
because nations fear losing their sovereignty to supranational forc-
es."0 The United States has historically feared loss of sovereignty
to world government, and the individual states have often pushed
hardest for protection of their interests in the face of international
economic agreements.
GAIT and NAFTA inevitably curtail state sovereignty to a
certain degree. However, the Constitution and caselaw grant signif-
icant powers to the federal government in the international eco-
nomic arena, and thus the states have traditionally exercised a
lesser degree of sovereignty in this field. Compelling arguments
dictate a unified international trade policy that only the federal
government can effectuate. Moreover, the agreements do not limit
sovereignty impermissibly because they provide safeguards to pro-
I.L.M. 296-456 & 605-800 [hereinafter NAFTA].
7. See GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, LAW, NORMS AND AUTHORrY 12-15 (1982) (describ-
ing the debate over the relationship between the validity of legal norms and their
"efficaciousness," i.e., their effective application when situations demand application).
8. See, e.g., BARRY E. CARTER & PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-15
(1991).
9. See LOW, supra note 4, at 9-33.
10. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 292 (1990):
[R]eserved domain [of domestic jurisdiction] is mysterious only because many
have failed to see that it really stands for a tautology. However, if a matter is
prima facie within the reserved domain because of its nature and the issue
presented in the normal case, then certain presumptions against any restriction
on that domain may be created.
See also Tycho H.E. Stahl, Liberalizing International Trade in Services: The Case for Side-
stepping the GATT, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 405, 429-33 (1994) (describing sovereignty and
national autonomy concerns that arise in response to international trade in services) (cita-
tion omitted).
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tect individual state laws, maintaining a proper balance between
state sovereignty and the advantages of international trade. Argu-
ments that surfaced during debates over ratification of NAFTA
and the Uruguay Round Agreements of GATT illustrate the ten-
sion between effective international trade regimes and state sover-
eignty concerns. By comparing the dispute resolution mechanisms
of GAIT and NAFTA in light of this international-domestic di-
chotomy, this Note focuses on sovereignty issues that arise when
the laws of one of the fifty states conflict with obligations arising
from international trade agreements and international trade dispute
settlement bodies.
In order to understand the perceived risk to state sovereignty
posed by GAT and NAFTA, Part I compares and contrasts dis-
pute settlement under the Uruguay Round Agreements and
NAFTA, with an emphasis on the binding nature of dispute settle-
ment under both agreements. This Part investigates the structure
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Dispute Settle-
ment Body (DSB) as well as two of NAFTA's dispute resolution
mechanisms-one dealing with general disputes and the other with
specific disputes over dumping and subsidies. The function and
process of dispute resolution panels, including provisions for appel-
late review and enforcement, make the new mechanisms both
more effective and potentially more threatening to state sovereign-
ty.
Part II then discusses how these trade agreements may affect
state sovereignty. This Part discusses dispute settlement under
GAIT and NAFTA to show that both treaties include safeguards
sufficient to protect state sovereignty interests while preserving the
primary goal of trade liberalization. Opponents have characterized
the WTO in GAT as a wholesale surrender of national and state
sovereignty to an international bureaucracy headquartered in Ge-
neva." Similarly, NAFTA dispute resolution mechanisms have
received considerable criticism because they allegedly sacrifice
sovereignty and domestic judicial review to international arbitral
panels.' However, practically and constitutionally, the federal
government is and should be the primary actor in international
trade policy. Although leaders cannot neglect state sovereignty
11. See infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
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issues, the structure of GATT and NAFTA does not damage state
sovereignty.
I. A COMPARISON OF GATT AND NAFTA
DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
A. Binding International Agreements
One element shared by GATT and NAFTA is a greater com-
mitment by member nations to accept these multilateral treaty
obligations as binding agreements. This acceptance should enhance
the effectiveness of the trade regimes embodied in the treaties, but
also raises concerns for state sovereignty. On April 15, 1994, rep-
resentatives from 124 governments and the European Community
signed the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 3 Subsequently, the
103rd U.S. Congress adopted implementing legislation for the new
GATT.14 One of the most significant developments for the Unit-
ed States and all GATT members is the establishment of the
WTO to administer dispute settlement procedures for GATT."5
Because of its recent inception, practical effects of this new dispute
settlement process remain to be seen.
Nevertheless, the Uruguay Round Agreements seek to en-
hance the binding legal effect of GATT. 6 The WTO Agreement
13. The Marrakesh Declaration, Focus: GATT NEWSL. (Information and Media Rela.
tions Division of GATT, Geneva, Switz.), May 1994, at 7.
14. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
[hereinafter Uruguay Act]. The House enacted GATT legislation by a vote of 288-146
on November 29, 1994. David E. Sanger, House Approves Trade Agreement by a Wide
Margin, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1994, at Al. The Senate approved the pact by a surpris-
ingly wide margin of 76-24 on December 1, 1994. David E. Sanger, Senate Approves Pact
to Ease Trade Curbs; A Victory for Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1994, at Al.
15. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
art. III, para. 3, reprinted in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 6, 7 (1994), 33
I.L.M. 1144, 1145 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
In addition to its dispute settlement function, the WTO will also facilitate the im-
plementation of GATT and the Multilateral Trade Agreements, provide a forum for
negotiations among GAT members, administer the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, and
cooperate, where appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Id. art. III.
16. The Marrakesh Declaration welcomed "the stronger and clearer legal framework
[the Members] have adopted for the conduct of international trade, including a more
effective and reliable dispute settlement mechanism." Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April
1994, para. 1, reprinted in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
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specifically provides that the agreements in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) are binding
on all members.17 This provision reflects a shift from past rounds
where parties to GATT could selectively choose which agreements
to accept without jeopardizing their status under the Agreement."
Thus, the Uruguay Round contains more binding international
legal obligations than past GATT agreements. It also provides
structures to enhance enforcement of the binding legal norms. 9
While GATT works on a global level, NAFrA seeks to en-
hance the binding nature of its obligations on a regional level.
NAFTA was signed by Canada, Mexico, and the United States on
December 17, 1992.20 Nearly a year later, the U.S. Congress
adopted its implementing legislation after a difficult congressional
battle.2 NAFTA is a free trade area whose primary objectives
are the promotion of free trade and investment through the elim-
ination of trade barriers and the facilitation of cross-border move-
ment of goods and services.' NAFTA adopted and expanded a
dispute resolution mechanism from the United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement (CFTA).24
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS iii (1994).
For example, import restricting safeguards are limited through time limits, investiga-
tions, and nondiscrimination among suppliers. Rules for the use of antidumping and coun-
tervailing duties are also clarified and subjected to tighter discipline. The Uruguay Round:
Results and Implications, WORLD ECON. OUTLOOK (International Monetary Fund, Wash.,
D.C.), May 1994, at 82, 83.
17. WTO Agreement, supra note 15, art. I. The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) is described in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 21
Annex 1A (1994). 1
18. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional Reform in the
New GAT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 478 (1994) (explaining Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, pt. II of Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), 33
1.L.M. 1, 13 (1994)).
19. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
20. Significant Events in the History of NAFTA, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2089
(Dec. 15, 1993).
21. The measure passed the House of Representatives on November 17, 1993 and
the Senate on November 20, 1993. David E. Rosenbaum, Without Earlier Drama, Trade
Accord is Passed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993, at A22.
22. GATT Article XXIV § 5 permits the formation of free trade areas among
GATT parties. A free trade area (FTA) is a group of two or more nations that have
agreed to eliminate substantially all trade barriers between their constituent territories.
However, each country may maintain separate trade policies with countries outside the
FTA. GATT 1947, supra note 5, 61 Stat. pts. 5-6, at A66-68, 55 U.N.T.S. at 268-72.
23. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 101, 102(1), 32 I.L.M. at 297.
24. See David S. Huntington, Settling Disputes Under the North American Free Trade
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Like the Uruguay Round of GATT, NAFTA includes en-
hanced obligations for its members. Article 105 specifically pro-
vides that "[tihe Parties shall ensure that all necessary measures
are taken in order to give effect to the provisions of this Agree-
ment, including their observance, except as otherwise provided in
this Agreement by state and provincial governments."'  In addi-
tion to this commitment to ensure state compliance with NAFTA
provisions, NAFTA embodies enhanced dispute resolution mecha-
nisms that differ depending on the nature of the dispute. Disputes
concerning dumping/antidumping duties26 and subsidies/counter-
vailing duties are dealt with in Chapter 19,7 whereas Chapter 20
provides a general framework for the settlement of other disputes.
However, both chapters focus on the use of dispute settlement
panels' similar to those in GATT as mechanisms for resolution
of difficult disputes. It is the nature and power of these panels
coupled with the federal government's commitment to enforce
NAFTA obligations that create fears of lost state sovereignty.
B. Dispute Settlement Bodies and Panels
GATT? and NAFTA dispute settlement bodies both seek to
centralize control over dispute settlement in an effort to facilitate
its use and effectiveness. The Uruguay Round Final Act establish-
Agreement, 34 HARv. INT'L Li. 407, 408-09 (1993) ("The bifurcated structure of NAFTA
dispute settlement is inherited directly from the Canada-U.S. FTA, and the general dis-
pute settlement provisions of both treaties are in many respects similar to the GATT
system."). The provisions of the CFTA are set forth at Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22,
1988, U.S.-Canada, 27 I.L.M. 281.
25. NAFrA, supra note 6, art. 105, 32 I.L.M. at 298.
26. Put simply, dumping occurs when an exporting industry sells its exported goods
in foreign markets at less than their fair value. Antidumping duties are designed to offset
the effects of price discrimination by individual producers. See PAUL B. STEPHAN III Er
AL, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS: LAW AND POLICY 724-25 (1993). For a
history of United States antidumping law, see PIETRO S. NIvOLA, REGULATING UNFAIR
TRADE 30-35 (1993).
27. Generally, countries may subsidize their products in two primary ways: They may
provide economic advantages to exporting industries as an incentive to increase exports;
or they may provide other subsidies, such as provision of inexpensive capital, to give
domestic producers a competitive advantage over foreign producers. Foreign countries that
oppose such subsidies claim their domestic industries are harmed by them and often
impose countervailing duties to restore competitive equality. This explanation greatly
oversimplifies a complex and highly technical body of U.S. and foreign law that addresses
countervailing duties. See STEPHAN Er AL., supra note 26, at 687, 699 . For a discussion
of recent subsidies issues, see NIVOLA, supra note 26, at 35-41.
28. See infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
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es a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to administer rules and pro-
cedures for dispute settlement, including establishment of panels,
adoption of panel reports, supervision of rulings and recommenda-
tions, and authorization for suspension of GATT obligations in
retaliation for harmful activity.29 The DSB has its own chair-
man and establishes its own rules of procedure, but the General
Council of the WTO has ultimate authority to "discharge the
responsibilities of the Dispute Settlement Body."31
In the past, trade controversies under GATT were settled
through a system based primarily on Articles XXII 3 and
XXII1 and subsequent understandings between the Contracting
Parties.' This system promoted consultations between disputing
parties and provided panels of three or five experts to adjudicate
trade controversies unresolved by consultation. 5 In the Uruguay
29. The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotia-
tions, Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (Apr. 15, 1994), art. 2(1) (33 I.L.M. 112, 114), reprinted in THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS
404, 405 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding on Dispute Settlement].
30. Australian Ambassador Donald Kenyon was elected to chair the DSB on January
31, 1995. The General Council of the World Trade Organization, MULTINATIONAL SER-
VICE, Feb. 2, 1995, available in WESTLAW, News Library, AllNews File, 1995 W.L.
8360028, at *3.
31. WTO Agreement, supra note 15, art. IV, para. 3, at 9, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at
1145.
32. Article XXII requires consultation between parties when one party claims a vio-
lation of GATT standards. This article further provides that a disputing party may call
upon the GATT Contracting Parties to consult with the disputing parties about the unre-
solved issue. GATI 1947, supra note 5, 61 Stat. pt. 5 at A64, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266.
33. Article XXIII provides that when a party finds that the benefits from GATT are
impaired or nullified by actions of another contracting party or any other situation, the
injured party may make written complaints to the offending country. If the injured party
receives no relief, the matter may be referred to the Contracting Parties of GATT who
will investigate the matter and make recommendations to the disputing parties, or rule on
the dispute. Id. at 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A64-65, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266-67.
34. See, e.g., Understanding on Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance of 28 November 1979 (26S/210), reprinted in GATT Index, supra note 3, at
586 (setting forth agreed description of customary dispute settlement practice).
Prior to the Uruguay Round Agreements, GATT referred to its participants as
parties, and the entity composed of all parties as the Contracting Parties. These designa-
tions reflected GATT's status as an agreement and not as an organization. David
Palmeter & Gregory J. Spak, Resolving Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Disputes:
Defining GA77s Role in an Era of Increasing Conflict, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS.
1145, 1146 n.6 (1993). However, under the Uruguay Round, GATT participants are mem-
bers of the World Trade Organization and this Note will refer to them as such. See
WTO Agreement, supra note 15, 33 I.L.M. at 1144-52.
35. Pierre Pescatore, The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism-Its Present Situation
GATT & NAFTA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Round Final Act, the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("the Understanding")
adopts goals from Articles XXII and XXIII, and provides a codi-
fied and coherent structure for resolution of disputes.36 The Un-
derstanding also states that a complaining Member may-but is
not required to-request consultations with the offending Member
to resolve a dispute. The Understanding further provides that if
consultations do not produce an acceptable result within sixty days,
the complaining Member may request a panel.37 Moreover, the
Understanding allows Members voluntarily to request good offic-
es,38 conciliation, and mediation at any time, including during the
course of a panel proceeding, and by any party to a dispute.39 By
centralizing and strengthening dispute settlement, the Uruguay
Round agreements will enhance free trade by enhancing compli-
ance with GAT? principles. However, the DSB also provides na-
tions greater opportunity to challenge laws of other nations that
allegedly violate GATT principles. Thus, GAT? 1994 heightens
the tension between effective international obligations and state
sovereignty concerns.
NAFTA dispute settlement reflects a similar desire for central-
ization and efficiency. Chapter 20 of NAFTA provides the basic
structure of its dispute settlement system. Article 2001 establishes
a Free Trade Commission (FTC) to supervise implementation,
elaboration, and dispute resolution under the Agreement.' Cab-
inet-level representatives from each nation make up the Commis-
sion, and all Commission decisions are made by consensus.4' This
structure parallels GAT 1994 in which the WTO supervises the
activities of a DSB. Under NAFrA, the Free Trade Commission
and Its Prospects, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 5-7 (1993).
36. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 29, art. 3(1), 33 I.L.M. at 115
("[M]embers . . . affirm their adherence to the principles for the management of disputes
heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1947 .... ); see also
Pescatore, supra note 35, at 16.
37. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 29, art. 4(2), (7), 33 I.L.M. at
116-17.
38. Good Offices refers to the practice of the Director-General of GATT (or a
group appointed by the Director) acting as an informal counsellor to assist the resolution
of a particular dispute. For examples, see GATT Index, supra note 3, at 714-15.
39. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 29, art. 5(1), (3), (5), 33 I.L.M.
at 117-18.
40. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 2001(1), (2), 32 I.L.M. at 693.
41. Id, art. 2001(1), (4), 32 I.L.M. at 693.
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will supervise the activities of a Secretariat charged with dispute
resolution. The Secretariat will include one section each for Cana-
da, Mexico, and the United States. Each party is responsible for
operation and costs of its section as well as payment of panel-
ists.42 The Agreement requires that the Secretariat provide assis-
tance to the Commission, to panels under both Chapters 19 and
20, and as directed by the Commission.' 3
Unlike GATT in which consultations are optional, parties
must use consultations and arbitration prior to a request for
NAFTA panel proceedings.' If the parties fail to resolve their
disputes through consultations among themselves, either party may
request that the Commission convene to provide good offices,
conciliation, and mediation.45 If the Commission has convened
and the matter has not been resolved within thirty days, either
party may request an arbitral panel.' Like those in GATT,
NAFTA's binding obligations inevitably face the tension between
effective international trade agreements and the sovereignty of the
fifty states.
Panels of experts have become and continue to be the pre-
ferred method of dispute settlement in both GATT and NAFIA.
Analyzing these mechanisms in both agreements illustrates the
panels' goal of effective dispute resolution as well as the potential
danger for intrusion of state sovereignty. Panels will persist as the
main dispute resolution mechanism under GATT 1994. The DSB
establishes dispute settlement panels to make objective assessments
of disputes before them and to provide the DSB with sufficient
information to make recommendations or rulings about disputes.47
The terms of reference for panels, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, are
[t]o examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of
the covered agreement/s cited by the parties to the dispute), the
42. Id art. 2002(2), 32 I.L.M. at 693.
43. Id. art. 2002(3), 32 I.L.M. at 693.
44. See Huntington, supra note 24, at 419 (arguing that NAFTA, unlike GATr,
limits consultations to the early stages of a dispute, thereby protecting the integrity of a
rule-oriented NAFTA panel process).
45. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 2007, 32 I.L.M. at 695. For a more detailed descrip-
tion of the consultation and alternative dispute resolution process, see Huntington, supra
note 24, at 417-19.
46. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 2008(1), 32 1.L.M. at 695.
47. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 29, art. 11, 33 I.L.M. at 120.
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matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document...
and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in
that/those agreement/s.4
A panel is expected to issue its final report within six months of
its establishment.O9 The panel may make a written request for
more time, but only for an additional three months." These
guidelines provide clear duties for panelists that should facilitate
their work, and the time limits will ensure prompt resolution of
disputed issues.
Article 6 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Gov-
erning the Settlement of Disputes provides that "[i]f the complain-
ing party so requests, a panel shall be established at the latest at
the DSB meeting following that at which the request first appears
as an item on the DSB's agenda, unless at that meeting the DSB
decides by consensus not to establish a panel."'" This provision
alters previous GATT practice: Prior Agreements did not include
clear language that a panel must be formed unless a consensus
existed against establishment. Instead, consensus was required to
decide whether a panel should consider the matter at all.'2 Two
prominent commentators consider this change to be a positive
step: "The new system will wisely eliminate the consensus require-
ment, though it will retain a useful safety valve of allowing an
appeal of a panel's report to a special review group."53
Article 8 provides that panels will include individuals well-
qualified in international trade issues from governments and/or
nongovernmental bodies.' The Understanding excludes citizens of
members whose governments are parties to the disputes, but the
disputing parties may waive this exclusion by agreement.55 The
Secretariat will propose nominations for specific panels, 6 and the
48. Id. art. 7(1), 33 I.L.M. at 118.
49. Id. art. 12(8), 33 I.L.M. at 121. A case of urgency (e.g., a dispute involving per-
ishable goods) requires that the panel attempt to issue its final report within three
months. Id.
50. Id. art. 12(9), 33 LL.M. at 121.
51. Id. art. 6(1), 33 I.L.M. at 118.
52. John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Law and Institutions for a New
Age, 81 GEO. LJ. 535, 549-50 (1993).
53. Id.
54. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 29, art. 8(1), 33 I.L.M. at 118.
55. Id. art. 8(3), 33 I.L.M. at 119.
56. Id. art. 8(6), 33 I.L.M. at 119. Panels will generally consist of three panelists, but
1995]
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parties to the dispute may block these nominations only for com-
pelling reasons." The Secretariat will maintain a list of well-quali-
fied individuals who may serve as panelists, and members may
suggest individuals to be added to the list.5 Persons can be
placed on the list without government nominations. Professor
Andreas Lowenfeld distinguishes this feature from that of NAFTA
where only individuals nominated by governments may appear on
these rosters.59 These provisions of the Understanding provide a
diverse and qualified group of adjudicators to sit on the panels. In
addition, by limiting the reasons for which persons may be exclud-
ed from panels, the Understanding facilitates prompt resolution of
trade disputes.
Adoption of panel decisions will occur more easily under the
Uruguay Round Agreements. Previous GATT practice had allowed
a Contracting Party (usually the party who lost the dispute) to
block adoption of a panel report because panel decisions did not
take effect until the GATT Council voted unanimously to accept
them.' Under the DSB system, the report will be adopted at a
meeting of the DSB within sixty days after the report has been
circulated to the Members." There are only two ways to prevent
adoption of a report. Both are fairly difficult: Either "one of the
parties to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to
appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the re-
port."6 Thus, the new system streamlines the process with specif-
ic time limits for adoption of panel decisions and facilitates the
effectiveness of panel decisions by providing limited avenues to
block them.
Similar to GATT's requirement that the DSB establish panels
upon request, NAFTA requires the Free Trade Commission to
establish an arbitral panel upon receipt of a request from a par-
ty. This provision creates a right to an arbitral panel.' With a
few differences, the panels will operate similarly to those under
the parties may agree on a panel of five. Id. art. 8(5), 33 I.L.M. at 119.
57. Id. art. 8(6), 33 I.L.M. at 119.
58. Id. art. 8(4), 33 I.L.M. at 119.
59. Lowenfeld, supra note 18, at 483.
60. Id. at 479-80.
61. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 29, art. 16(4), 33 I.L.M. at 123.
62. Id.
63. NAFrA, supra note 6, art. 2008(2), 32 I.L.M. at 695.
64. Huntington, supra note 24, at 419.
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GATr. As described above, NAFTA panelists must be nominated
by their governments, which may possibly limit the number of
qualified people who will serve as panelists.65 Unlike GATT pan-
els, which generally have three members,66 NAFTA panels will
have five members. The selection procedures differ depending
upon the number of parties in dispute. Generally, the disputing
parties must first agree on a chair for the panel and then each
party chooses two citizens from the opposing party or parties to
serve as panelists.67 Finally, while GATT procedures require that
parties have peremptory challenges against panelists for compelling
reasons, the NAFTA selection process only provides the use of pe-
remptory challenges against panelists who are not selected from
the roster.' Thus, NAFTA makes it more difficult to remove
panelists by using peremptory challenges. However, because parties
choose panelists from opponents' countries, parties will have great-
er control over the selection process and both countries will be
equally represented, which will decrease the need for peremptory
challenges.
Article 2012 provides the rules of procedure for panels. The
Commission establishes model rules of procedure based on two
principles: "[T]he procedures shall assure a right to at least one
hearing before the panel as well as the opportunity to provide
initial and rebuttal written submissions; and the panel's hearings,
deliberations and initial report, and all written submissions to and
communications with the panel shall be confidential."69 Like
GATr panels, NAFTA panels will have specific terms of reference
for dispute settlement:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the Agree-
ment, the matter referred to the Commission (as set out in the
request for a Commission meeting) and to make findings, deter-
minations and recommendations as provided in Article 2016(2).7o
65. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 56.
67. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 2011(1), (2), 32 I.L.M. at 696. This procedure alters
the CFTA procedure that allowed countries to choose their own citizens as panelists.
Huntington, supra note 24, at 421.
68. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 2011(3), 32 I.L.M. at 696. Article 2011(4) provides
that if disputing Parties agree that a panelist has violated the code of conduct, that pan-
elist shall be replaced.
69. Id. art. 2012(1)(a), (b), 32 I.L.M. at 696.
70. Id. art. 2012(3), 32 I.L.M. at 696.
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These clear terms of reference, guarantees of confidentiality, and
right to at least one hearing give NAFTA greater credibility as an
effective legal means of dispute resolution.
After the panel has completed its work, it issues initial and
final reports. The initial report allows disputing parties to review
the panel's findings of fact, determination of the dispute, and
recommendations for resolving the dispute. Disputing parties have
fourteen days to make comments on this initial report.71 This
phase provides parties with another opportunity to voice their
views, and therefore may increase compliance with panel reports
because parties are more likely to feel they had significant input
into the panel decision.' Moreover, this phase may decrease
parties' concerns about sovereignty because they will have more
active participation in the panel process. Subsequently, the panel
may revise or reconsider its findings, but the panel must issue a
final report within thirty days of the initial report.73 Unless the
Commission decides otherwise, the report will be published fifteen
days after it is sent to the Commission.' 4 Notably, panels cannot
reveal which members sided with the minority or majority view in
their reports.' This secrecy could provide greater compliance
with panel reports as parties have no basis to complain that deci-
sions were made according to the national interests of the panel-
ists. However, secrecy may cause countries to reject panel deci-
sions based on a belief that decisions are secretly partisan.
C. Appellate Review and Enforcement
One of the main differences between GATT and NAFTA is
that NAFTA Chapter 20,76 unlike the GAT DSB, does not pro-
vide for an appeals process to panel decisions. However, Chapter
19 of NAFTA" does provide for appeals in a narrow field of
71. Id. art. 2016(2), (4), 32 I.L.M. at 696.
72. Huntington, supra note 24, at 422. Huntington also notes that this review phase
may allow parties to exert undue influence on the panelists, which could damage the
panel's ultimate decision.
73. NAFTA, supra note 6, arts. 2016(5), 2017(1), 32 I.L.M. at 697. Article 2017 also
allows extension of the 30-day period with the consent of the disputing parties.
74. l& art. 2017(4), 32 I.L.M. at 697.
75. Id. art. 2017(2), 32 1.L.M. at 697.
76. ld, 32 I.L.M. at 693.
77. Mat, 32 I.L.M. at 682.
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trade disputes. This difference mainly reflects the two agreements'
approaches to enforcement. Whereas GATT enhances specific pro-
visions for enforcement, NAFTA relies more on the parties and
their willingness to implement and respect trade obligations. This
difference is defensible, however, because NAFTA treats a more
limited number of countries whose interests are more easily recon-
ciled. In contrast, GATT must provide more binding measures be-
cause it operates at a global level.
While the GATT DSB will facilitate dispute settlement, a new
appellate review system will help protect members from the adop-
tion of erroneous decisions. The DSB established a standing appel-
late body of seven persons, three of whom will hear an individual
case.78 Unlike panels of initial review, the appellate body will not
include representatives from any government.79 Professor Andreas
Lowenfeld has indicated two major areas of concern with this new
appellate body. 0 First, Article 17(6) limits the scope of review to
issues of law and legal interpretations.8 However, legal and factu-
al issues usually are interrelated, and the appellate body may
spend too much of its limited time attempting to separate law
from fact.' Second, for members to accept the new system, the
appellate body must retain actual and perceived independence
from nationalistic or political influences. To achieve this goal, the
Secretariat should provide support for the panel process, but
should not involve itself in the substance of the appeals process.83
If the appellate body can maintain its independence and provide
reasoned, unbiased opinions, it has great potential to strengthen
and expand the effectiveness of dispute resolution.
The issue of standing to request a GATT panel is also impor-
tant. According to Article 3(7), only members of the WTO can
bring a complaint against another member.' Thus, private parties
that claim injury from foreign trade practices must ask their gov-
ernments to bring a complaint on their behalf. Allowing private
parties to bring complaints as well as governments could depoliti-
78. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 29, art. 17(1), 33 I.L.M. at 123.
79. Id. art. 17(3), 33 I.L.M. at 123.
80. Lowenfeld, supra note 18, at 484.
81. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 29, art. 17(6), 33 I.L.M. at 123.
82. Lowenfeld, supra note 18, at 484.
83. 1d at 485.
84. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 29, art. 3(7), 33 I.L.M. at 115.
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cize the review process and enhance its legitimacy.' However, for
now, industries and other private parties claiming that foreign
countries are violating GATT norms must rely on their home
governments to bring complaints before the DSB.
In addition to the appeals process, another critical element of
the DSB is an enhanced ability to implement, supervise, and en-
force its rulings and recommendations. The DSB commits Mem-
bers to prompt compliance with recommendations and rulings.86
Moreover, the DSB provides specific enforcement requirements,
including limited time periods for compliance 7 and surveillance
of implementation of adopted rulings or recommendations." As a
last resort, an injured Member may receive compensation and
suspend GATT advantages from a Member that fails to comply.89
These specific enforcement mechanisms both should enhance the
credibility of the DSB and increase compliance with GATT obliga-
tions as determined by panels.
A final aspect of the new Agreement is its limitation on the
use of retaliatory trade measures. Article 23 of the Understanding
specifically limits Members' use of retaliatory measures, such as
suspension of GATT concessions or obligations, by requiring de-
termination of harmful activity only through the DSB system and
suspension of concessions only upon DSB approval.90 Professor
Lowenfeld argues that industries will primarily use measures like
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 19749' to pressure their govern-
ments to bring complaints to the DSB, rather than use such mea-
sures to retaliate unilaterally.' Members of Congress viewed this
limitation with concern: "[T]he Agreement would have consider-
able limiting effect on our ability to use 3012"
85. See Barton & Carter, supra note 52, at 550.
86. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 29, art. 21(1), 33 I.L.M. at 125.
87. Id. art. 21(3), 33 I.L.M. at 125 (requiring compliance immediately unless impracti-
cable; if impracticable, a reasonable. period of time for compliance will be determined).
88. Id& art. 21(6), 33 I.L.M. at 126 (placing implementation issues on the DSB agen-
da until resolved).
89. Id. art. 22, 33 I.L.M. at 126.
90. Id. art. 23(2), 33 I.L.M. at 128-29.
91. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988). Section 301, commonly called Super 301, provides the
authority for the Executive to investigate unfair trade practices and take retaliatory steps
when necessary. For a detailed description of Super 301, see Low, supra note 4, at
87-96.
92. Lowenfeld, supra note 18, at 481.
93. David S. Cloud, Super 301: An Ever-Popular Weapon, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
778, 793 (1994) (statement of Rep. Sander M. Levin, D-Mich., House Ways and Means
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Notably absent from Chapter 20 of NAFTA is a provision for
appellate review. While GAT-T and Chapter 19 of NAFTA both
include some type of appeals process, Chapter 20 envisions en-
forcement primarily by the disputing parties and does not provide
for appeals of panel reports. Furthermore, recall that Chapter 19
focuses on the narrow area of international dumping and counter-
vailing duty trade disputes, whereas Chapter 20 addresses dispute
settlement in a broader range of areas.94 The enforcement provi-
sions of Chapter 20 are straightforward:
On receipt of the final report of a panel, the disputing Par-
ties shall agree on the resolution of the dispute, which normally
shall conform with the determinations and recommendations of
the panel, and shall notify their Sections of the Secretariat of any
agreed resolution of any dispute. 5
Ideally, an offending party will agree not to implement the non-
conforming measure or to remove the protectionist measure alto-
gether. When parties cannot agree to do so, the nonconforming
party may pay compensation.9 6 Finally, if no mutually satisfactory
agreement has been reached within thirty days of the final report,
the complaining party may suspend benefits of "equivalent effect"
until the parties reach agreement. 7 In a comparison of GATT
and NAFTA, GATT focuses more on the enforcement of the
panel decision through surveillance and reporting at the DSB level,
whereas NAFTA emphasizes bilateral resolution of disputes and
provides suspension of benefits for failure to comply.98
Because of its significance in U.S. trade law, it is also impor-
tant to consider briefly Chapter 19 of NAFTA. First, unlike Chap-
ter 20, Chapter 19 provides review and dispute settlement in
antidumping and countervailing duty cases. While many of the
dispute resolution mechanisms are identical to those in Chapter 20,
there are some fundamental differences. Chapter 19 does not alter
domestic law; in fact, Article 1902 explicitly provides that the
parties may retain and continue to apply their existing counter-
Subcommittee on Trade). Full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
94. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
95. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 2018(1), 32 I.L.M. at 697.
96. Id. art. 2018(2), 32 I.L.M. at 697.
97. Id. art. 2019(1), 32 I.L.M. at 697.
98. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text; see also Huntington, supra note
24, at 423-24.
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vailing duty and antidimping laws. Article 1902 is an important
provision for the United States, which has consistently used these
retaliatory measures to protect U.S. industry from foreign industri-
al policies and attempts to gain U.S. market share through dump-
ing.99 Moreover, binational panels will review the final anti-
dumping or countervailing duty determinations of a party when
requested by another party."° Thus, for the United States, panels
will review the final determinations of both the U.S. Department
of Commerce and the International Trade Commission, the agen-
cies where most international trade litigation commences." 1 Fi-
nally, Chapter 19 will likely have greater importance than Chapter
20 because past history has shown that parties will generally use
the former more frequently.'0
Chapter 19 also allows parties to challenge amendments to
other parties' countervailing and antidumping duty laws. 3 A
party may challenge another party's proposed amendment on
grounds that it violates GATT standards, is contrary to the pur-
pose of NAFTA, or violates any prior NAFTA panel rulings.
Thus, parties can protest protectionist laws before they develop
into trade disputes. This provision and standard of review should
help reduce nationalistic pressures in panels by referring to an
outside agreement (GATT), by appealing to the fairness principle
in NAFTA, and by protecting prior panel rulings."°
A major difference between Chapters 19 and 20 involves the
issue of standing. When disputes arise concerning the application
of one party's law under Chapter 19, private parties are guaran-
teed the same right that they possess under domestic law to chal-
lenge agency determinations." This provision is important for
99. Kristin Moody-O'Grady, Dispute Settlement Provisions in the NAFTA and the
CAFTA: Progress or Protectionism?, FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF., Winter/Spring 1994,
at 121, 122-23.
100. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 1904(2), 32 I.L.M. at 683.
101. Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: Binational Panels as the Trade
Courts of Last Resort, 27 INT'L LAW. 707, 708 (1993).
102. Gary N. Horlick & F. Amanda DeBusk, Dispute Resolution under
NAFTA-Building on the U.S.-Canada FTA, GATT and ICSID, 27 . WORLD TRADE 21,
27 (1993) (arguing that under a similar provision in the U.S.-Canada FTA, parties used
Chapter 19 panels much more than other types of panels).
103. NAFrA, supra note 6, art. 1903(1), 32 LL.M. at 682.
104. Moody-O'Grady, supra note 99, at 127.
105. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 1904(5), 32 I.L.M. at 683 ("An involved Party ...
shall, on request of a person who would otherwise be entitled under the law of the im-
porting Party to commence domestic procedures for judicial review of that final determi-
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industries affected by unfair trade practices as they retain the right
to contest those practices within the NAFTA framework. More-
over, it allows more direct pressure from industry rather than
requiring all complaints to be filtered through the government
first.
When Chapter 19 is used to review final agency determina-
tions of dumping or an existence of subsidies, the binational panel
will replace domestic judicial review, 6 but apply the same stan-
dard of review that the challenged country's courts would ap-
ply."° Moreover, unlike Chapter 20 panel rulings, which allow
parties to accept the panel decision or agree to their own solution,
Chapter 19 panel decisions are explicitly binding on the par-
ties.' 8 While Chapter 20 panels offer recommendations and rul-
ings, Chapter 19 panels are required either to affirm or to remand
decisions of the national agencies. 9 Finally, contrary to Chapter
20 panels that lack an appellate review mechanism, Chapter 19 es-
tablishes an extraordinary challenge procedure whereby parties
may challenge panel findings on grounds of misconduct."0 These
provisions provide parties with strong tools to challenge subsidies
and dumping expediently. However, both Chapter 19 and Chapter
20 dispute settlement provisions also form the basis of some com-
nation, request such review.").
106. Id. art. 1904(1), 32 I.L.M. at 683.
107. ld. art 1904(3), 32 I.L.M. at 683. For a description of these standards of review,
see Hoflick & DeBusk, supra note 102, at 28.
108. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 1904(9), 32 I.L.M. at 683 ("The decision of a panel
under this Article shall be binding on the involved Parties with respect to the particular
matter between the Parties that is before the panel.").
109. Id. art. 1904(8), 32 I.L.M. at 683.
110.
Where, within a reasonable time after the panel decision is issued, an involved
Party alleges that:
(a) (i) a member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias,
or a serious conflict of interest, or otherwise materially violat-
ed the rules of conduct,
(ii) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of pro-
cedure, or
(iii) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or
jurisdiction set out in this Article, for example by failing to
apply the appropriate standard of review, and
(b) any of the actions set out in subparagraph (a) has materially affect-
ed the panel's decision and threatens the integrity of the binational
panel review process, that party may avail itself of the extraordinary
challenge procedure set out in Annex 1904.13.
Id. art. 1904(13), 32 I.L.M. at 683.
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plaints that NAFTA steals sovereignty from the states."' With
the key provisions of these agreements in mind, consider the com-
pelling reasons why GATT and NAFTA do not violate state sov-
ereignty in light of some arguments made against GATT and
NAFTA.
IL THE EFFECTS OF GATT] AND NAFTA PANEL
DECISIONS ON STATE SOVEREIGNTY
The federal government holds a preeminent position over the
states in the area of international trade policy and agreements.
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution grants Congress the
authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." ' The Supreme
Court has long "recognized that [the Commerce Clause] also limits
the power of the States to erect barriers against interstate
trade."" 3 Furthernmore, the Supreme Court has deferred to fed-
eral law, particularly in matters involving international com-
merce."' The Court has emphasized the importance that the
United States "speak[] with one voice when regulating commercial
relations with foreign governments.""' 5 Speaking with one voice
prevents the states from imposing burdens on international trade
that conflict with national policy goals, decrease trade flows, and
thus harm national economic vitality. Finally, federal law has al-
ways constrained the exercise of state power." 6 In the context of
GATT and NAFTA, the federal government persists as the princi-
pal decisionmaker. Therefore, any arguments claiming that these
agreements overly infringe upon state sovereignty must first defeat
111. See infra notes 201-12 and accompanying text.
112. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cI. 3.
113. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980).
114. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 453-54 (1979)
(invalidating a California ad valorem property tax imposed on foreign-owned cargo con-
tainers used in international commerce); MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1, 10 (1972) (upholding a forum selection clause that selected a British court to be bind-
ing on the parties); see also Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 45 OHiO ST. L.J. 265,
300-01 (1984) (arguing that although the Court will not likely strike down the convention
as an intrusion on state law, serious concerns exist concerning implementation of the con-
vention).
115. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451.
116. John W. Head, Supranational Law: How the Move Toward Multilateral Solutions
Is Changing the Character of "International" Law, 42 KAN. L. REV. 605, 662 (1994).
[Vol. 45:216
GATT & NAFTA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
the strong presumption that the federal government has primary
responsibility for international commerce. These arguments have
failed to overcome this presumption.
A. GATT and the States
By enhancing the dispute settlement provisions of GATT
through the WTO and the DSB, Members have agreed to subject
their domestic systems to a greater degree of supranational legal
control. Under GATT 1994, nations are bound to a greater num-
ber of agreements, and dispute panels have enhanced ability to en-
force dispute settlements."7 Thus, individual states will be re-
quired to comply with the rulings of international panels, which
limits state sovereignty to a certain degree. In exchange for de-
creased legal control, the Uruguay Round Agreements promise
significant advantages. An improved GATT promises enormous
increases in global prosperity through the reduction of trade barri-
ers." 8 Moreover, the new dispute resolution mechanism offers
more efficient and reliable settlement of trade controversies.
1. GATT: Congressional-Executive Agreement or Treaty? This
section will show that despite arguments to the contrary, passage
of the Uruguay Round Agreements as a congressional-executive
agreement rather than a treaty did not jeopardize state sovereignty
interests. The debate concerning the form of GATT highlights the
sovereignty concerns that persisted throughout the process to
adopt the agreements into U.S. law. The Uruguay Round
Agreements Act" 9 passed the U.S. Congress as a congressional-
executive agreement under a procedural device known as "fast
track."2 Presidents prefer to negotiate trade agreements under
117. See supra notes 16-19, 86-89 and accompanying text.
118. Analysts estimate that the Uruguay Round agreements will increase world exports
by $755 billion and raise world incomes by $235 billion annually. The WTO is Born, Fo-
cus: GATT NEWSL. (Information and Media Relations Division of GATT, Geneva,
Switz.), May 1994, at 1. The Council of Economic Advisers estimates national income will
increase by $100 to $200 billion by the tenth year of the new agreement. Bob Benenson,
With Health Care Receding, GATT Pact Gains Urgency, 52 CONG. Q. 2661, 2664 (1994).
However, "Estimates of how much [GATT] would benefit the American economy ...
vary so widely that they are almost useless." David E. Sanger, Clinton Pledges to Push
for Vote on Trade Accord, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 1994, at Al.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 3511 (1994).
120. Fast track authority began under the Trade Act of 1974. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101,
2111-12, 2191-93 (1988). Since the 1974 Act, fast track authority has expired periodically
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fast track because it imposes time limits for both houses of
Congress to vote yes or no on implementing legislation without
amendment."' Fast track serves two important ends. First, it
provides the President with flexibility and credibility when negoti-
ating trade agreements because trading partners have greater
confidence that Congress will not unravel hard-won trade
agreements. Second, it ensures presidential accountability to the
legislative branch because Congress still participates in drafting and
adoption of the implementing legislation."z
Representatives of the executive branch and other commenta-
tors made compelling arguments supporting passage of the Uru-
guay Round Agreements as a congressional-executive agreement.
Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger sent a memorandum
to Trade Representative Michael Kantor that had a significant
effect on the congressional debate about GATT's status."z Re-
sponding to arguments from Professor Laurence Tribe 24 that the
Uruguay Round Agreements so violated state sovereignty that
and has been renewed for various trade agreements. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2902(e) (1994)
(extending fast track authority for GATT through April 16, 1994).
121. Fast Track has five main elements. First, the President must notify the House
Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committees of his intent to enter a trade
agreement 120 days before actually signing such an agreement. 19 U.S.C. § 2112(e)(1)
(1988). Second, once the agreement is signed, the President must submit the agreement,
implementing legislation, and supporting information to the House and Senate. Id.
§ 2112(e)(2) (1988). Members of Congress cannot amend the implementing legislation. Id.
§ 2191(d). Third, both houses of Congress must vote on the implementing legislation
within 60 days, or, if the bill contains revenue provisions, 90 days. Id. § 2191(e). Fourth,
if a committee fails to report the implementing legislation to the floor of either house
within 45 days, the bill is automatically discharged to the floor. Id. Fifth, floor debate in
both houses is limited to 20 hours, after which the House and Senate must vote. IaL
§ 2191(f).
122. See Harold H. Koh, Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 143, 148 (1992).
123. See Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel to Ambassador Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, (Nov. 22,
1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter OLC GATT Memo]. While this Note focuses on
the state sovereignty issue, Mr. Dellinger also argued that because the Treaty Clause and
subsequent caselaw do not provide clear-cut tests for determining when agreements are
treaties, this determination should be made by examining precedents of the executive and
legislative branches acting together under their respective foreign Commerce Clause and
foreign affairs powers. lId at 2-4. Furthermore, the political branches can and have con-
cluded significant treaties like the Uruguay Round Agreements. Id. at 5 (citing United
States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 393 (1990) (finding Senate had incentive and mech-
anism to stop such agreements but did not do so)).
124. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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they required Treaty Clause"z consideration, Mr. Dellinger
wrote: "[I]f the Uruguay Round Agreements unduly invade State
sovereignty, ratification as a treaty will not save them from uncon-
stitutionality; if they are not an undue invasion, they can be given
effect by Act of Congress."'
1
Moreover, Professor Bruce Ackerman, joined by a distin-
guished group of professors of international and constitutional law,
rejected Professor Tribe's assertion that because the Agreements
implicated state sovereignty, the Senate would best represent state
interests."2 They argued that the House, not the Senate, better
represents state interests because many Senators are national fig-
ures detached from local issues. They further asserted that the
joint action of the House and Senate on congressional-executive
agreements better represents federalist values, and prevents the
Senate from blocking important international agreements by a
minority of one-third plus one under the Treaty Clause. Finally,
they maintained that because the WTO will have significant impact
on world trade and because the House retains revenue-raising re-
sponsibility, both houses of Congress should pass the Agree-
ment."m Taken together, these arguments illustrate the fallacy
behind the argument favoring Treaty Clause consideration as a
protection for state sovereignty by showing that the congressional-
executive agreement provides a valid means for adopting laws that
are supreme to state laws and that the full Congress, not the Sen-
ate alone, provides the greatest protection for states' rights.
Members of Congress also rejected the argument that state
sovereignty concerns necessitated Treaty Clause consideration for
the Uruguay Round. As one senator stated,
Another important concern some have in our country, and in my
State, is that this agreement appears to be a treaty .... It is im-
portant to point out this is not a treaty. It was not negotiated as
such. It has always been considered an executive agreement by
all parties involved .... [U]nder Article I of the Constitution,
the Congress has the power to regulate commerce with foreign
125. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
126. OLC GATr Memo, supra note 123, at 11.
127. GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings on S.2467 Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 529 (Oct. 18, 1994) (pre-
pared statement of Prof. Bruce A. Ackerman et al.).
128. Id. at 9-10.
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nations. Hence, only a majority vote in both Chambers of Con-
gress is required.129
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan further argued that "the WTO is
an [A]rticle I issue. Commerce and revenue are its principal fea-
tures .... Treating this matter as a treaty would keep the House
out of this and confine it to the Senate, contrary to the practice
since 1934. " "13
During the debates concerning GATT's implementing legisla-
tion, Professor Laurence Tribe argued before Congress that the
Uruguay Round Agreements should be considered as a formal
treaty requiring advice and consent of the Senate, not as a con-
gressional-executive agreement under fast track.' Tribe ex-
plained that through a series of political compromises following
World War II, Presidents negotiated and submitted many interna-
tional agreements as congressional-executive agreements, thereby
circumventing and weakening the Treaty Clause. Moreover, he
claimed that certain agreements had such broad scope and effect
that they required Treaty Clause scrutiny; otherwise, "[i]f the
Treaty Clause may be disregarded for the CFTA, for NAFTA, and
for the Uruguay Round of GATT, it may come to be disregarded
altogether and for all time."'3 Finally, he argued that because
the new WTO posed such significant threats to individual state
sovereignty, the Agreement had to be considered under the Treaty
Clause so that the Senate could best protect state interests.33
During debates over the Uruguay Round Implementation Act,
members of Congress reiterated arguments that GATT should
receive consideration under the Treaty Clause. For example, Sena-
tor Ted Stevens of Alaska argued, "I believe that the GAIT
Agreement should be submitted to the Senate as a treaty because
the World Trade Organization Council and the dispute resolution
129. 140 CONG. REc. S15,275 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1994) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
130. 140 CONG. REc. S15,079 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1994) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
The Senator also argued that sovereignty concerns had been effectively refuted, especially
because "[w]e yet govern ourselves, with the authority to regulate commerce with foreign
nations given to the Congress." Id. at S15,081.
131. GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings on S.2467 Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 296 (Oct. 18, 1994) (pre-
pared statement of Professor Laurence H. Tribe) [hereinafter Tribe GATT Statement].
There are many facets to the argument, but this Note focuses on how failure to consider
GATT as a treaty affects state sovereignty.
132. Id. at 14.
133. Id. at 1, 18-19.
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mechanism diminish the sovereignty of the individual states. 13
Even in the House, where consideration of GATT as a treaty
meant House members would not participate in passing the legis-
lation, Congressman Eliot Engel from New York also argued that
"this agreement ought to be considered as a treaty.' 1 35 Thus,
members of Congress shared unfounded concerns that GATT 1994
would overwhelm state sovereignty.
Based in part on concerns that the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments would threaten state sovereignty, many argued that GATT
should be considered as a formal treaty. These arguments reflect
the natural tendency toward protectionism when nations contem-
plate enhancing supranational legal control. However, arguments
that GATT should receive treaty consideration were not convinc-
ing largely because they overstated the threat posed by GATT and
the Treaty Clause's ability to defend state interests. In fact, Profes-
sor Tribe retracted his opposition to GAT? in direct response to
the memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel. While retain-
ing his belief that the Senate's constitutional role in treaty ratifica-
tion generally deserved more serious consideration, Professor Tribe
wrote:
I regard it as my responsibility, in light of Assistant Attorney
General Dellinger's recent forceful analysis, to say that I believe
the Clinton Administration has based its position on the Uruguay
Round Agreements on constitutional arguments that are both
powerful and plausible. It would therefore be incorrect to quote
or to rely upon my earlier contrary views without adding this
important qualification."
Thus, Professor Tribe had some lingering concerns about the Uru-
guay Round Agreements, but not enough to oppose passage of the
implementing legislation.37
Therefore, although questions may remain about the effect of
the Uruguay Round Agreements on state sovereignty, treating
134. 140 CONG. REC. S15,151 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1994) (statement of Sen. Stevens).
135. 140 CONG. REc. H11,495 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Engel).
136. Letter from Professor Laurence H. Tribe to Senator George J. Mitchell (Nov. 28,
1994), reprinted in 140 CONG. REC. S15,078 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1994).
137. For a more cynical view, see 140 CONG. REC. S15,151 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Stevens) ("I regret to say [Professor Tribe] has recanted his position
at the last minute, as he started to count votes because of the circumstance that he does
support GATT, but he opposes the process.").
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GATT or other trade agreements under the Treaty Clause will not
resolve state sovereignty concerns. In fact, the requirement of
Treaty Clause procedures would vitiate many prior valid trade
agreements, weaken Presidential ability to enter trade agreements,
and harm state sovereignty interests by excluding the House from
participating in ratification.
2. GATT in U.S. Law. To understand why state sovereignty
issues raised such concern, it is important to consider how GATT
panel decisions could affect state laws. While GATT is not
considered a treaty under the Treaty Clause, it is a congressional-
executive agreement enacted by a federal statute, which gives it
the same effect as a treaty for purposes of domestic U.S. law. 13
It is therefore supreme over prior conflicting local, state,'39 and
federal law."4 In fact, for most of the WTO's dissenters, the is-
sue was not whether the Uruguay Round Agreements would affect
state law, but rather to what extent they would affect state law. 41
Before the Uruguay Round Agreements, Professor Robert Hudec
argued that "the weight of the evidence still favours the view that
Article XXIV:12 obligates the United States to compel state ad-
herence to GATT, and that GATT is thus superior to state
law.
1 42
138. Thomas W. France, Note, The Domestic Legal Status of the GATT The Need for
Clarification, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1481, 1495-99 (1994).
139. See OLC GAIT Memo, supra note 123, at 11 n.30; United States-Measures Af-
fecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, GATT Doc. DS23/R at 86 (Mar. 16, 1992) (citing
Robert E. Hudec, The Legal Status of GATT in the Domestic Law of the United States,
in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 187 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986));
Jeffry C. Clark, The United States Proposal for a General Agreement on Trade in Services
and Its Preemption of Inconsistent State Law, 15 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 75, 97
(1992); John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States
Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 249, 297-98 (1967); see also Steve Charnovitz, The
Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23 ENVTL. L. 475, 501-09 (1993)
(discussing responsibility of federal government to implement GATT).
140. For more detailed descriptions of the relationship between GATT and federal
law, see Robert E. Hudec, The Legal Status of GATT in the Domestic Law of the United
States, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATr, 199-218 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds,
1986) (discussing generally GATT's status in U.S. federal law); Don Mayer & David
Hoch, International Environmental Protection and the GATT: The Tuna/Dolphin Contro-
versy, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 187, 215-24 (1993) (discussing a GATT panel ruling that invali-
dated a U.S. embargo of tuna from Mexico under the Marine Mammal Protection Act
for violating GATT Article XI).
141. See infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
142. Hudec, supra note 140, at 221.
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The Supreme Court has never directly considered the applica-
tion of GATT to state law.143 However, other courts have held
that GATT preempts state law.'" For example, the California
Court of Appeals in Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior
Court of San Francisco found GATT controlling over state
law.45 In Baldwin-Lima, construction companies had made bids
for a project that required all materials and equipment, except
one, to be manufactured in the United States in accordance with a
California "buy-American" law. The construction company that
won the bid had disregarded the buy-American provision and
submitted the lowest bid by using foreign materials. The winning
construction company based its decision to use foreign material on
advice from the San Francisco City Attorney that the buy-Ameri-
can provision was invalid. 46 The Court of Appeals described the
relationship between the Treaty and Supremacy Clauses, and held
that "[wihen a state statute conflicts with any such treaty, the
latter will control. Compacts and similar international agreements,
such as GATT, which are negotiated and proclaimed by the Presi-
dent are 'treaties' within the above [S]upremacy [C]lause of the
Constitution."'47
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court discussed the rela-
tionship of GATT to a state statute requiring purchase of Ameri-
can-made materials for construction of water diversion and treat-
ment facilities.'" The court recognized that "GAT is, by virtue
of the federal constitution, 'the supreme Law of the Land.' A state
law must yield when it is inconsistent with or impairs the policy or
provisions of a treaty."'4 9 However, the court found the statute
in question exempt from GATT because it required use of Ameri-
143. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 439 n.4 (1979)
(rejecting argument that California ad valorem tax violated Art. III, §§ 1-2 of GATT be-
cause no evidence that California treated Japanese carriers differently from domestic
carriers); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 457 (1978) ("[T]he
Secretary's [of the Treasury] position has been incorporated into the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which is followed by every major trading nation in the
world ....").
144. See Hudec, supra note 140, at 221-25.
145. 25 Cal. Rptr. 798, 808 (1962).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 809 (citations omitted).
148. K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 381
A.2d 774, 777-78 (NJ. 1977).
149. Id. at 778 (citations omitted).
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can goods for governmental purposes (i.e., dam building), not for
production of goods for sale. 5' Overall, it is well accepted that
obligations in the Uruguay Round Agreements are superior to
conflicting state law. Thus, determining how GATT obligations will
translate into state law requires further analysis.
To understand the effect of GAT] panel decisions on incon-
sistent state law, consider a 1992 panel decision against the United
States known as Beer IV Canada challenged federal and state
tax laws as well as other laws that allegedly favored U.S. beer and
wine producers over foreign producers in violation of GAT Arti-
cles III(1), (2), and (4).152 In a carefully reasoned opinion relying
on GATT provisions, U.S. caselaw, and opinions of noted authors,
the panel upheld certain state laws, but found that others violated
GATT; it recommended that the United States bring the inconsis-
tent laws into conformity.'53
This case illustrates two important points. First, GATT panels
have carefully considered both the laws of the disputing parties as
well as GATT norms. In Beer II, the panel did not summarily
invalidate scores of state laws; rather, it carefully balanced compet-
ing policy and legal concerns to arrive at an acceptable conclusion.
There is no reason to believe that future panels under the DSB
will not perform with similar success. Second, the state laws found
to be inconsistent with GAT were not immediately reversed, nor
150. Id. at 780-82.
151. United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, Report of the
Panel, GATT Doc. DS23/R (Mar. 16, 1992) [hereinafter Beer 11]; see also David S.
Cloud, Critics Fear GATT May Declare Open Season on U.S. Law, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP. 2005, 2009 (1994); Tribe GAIT Statement, supra note 131, at 26-27.
152. See Beer II, supra note 151, para. 6.1 (citing Article III(1), which prohibits pro-
tectionist use of tariffs; Article 111(2), which prohibits charging imports higher internal
taxes than domestic goods; and Article 111(4), which provides that products imported
from contracting parties must receive no less favorable treatment than domestic products).
153. Id. para. 6.1(r). For example, the panel ruled that GATT did not prohibit laws
in nine states that restrict sale, distribution, and labelling of beer that is above a speci-
fied alcohol content. The panel found that high and low alcohol content beers are not
treated as products, so they may be regulated differently; policy goals of protecting hu-
man life motivated these regulations; and the regulations were not applied to afford
protection to domestic producers. Id. para. 5.74-77.
However, the panel ruled that laws in 30 states violated GAIT Art. 111(4) by
requiring imported beer and wine to be sold through in-state wholesalers, despite the fact
that out-of-state beer was treated as an import. Id. para. 5.32-33. Moreover, the court
rejected the argument that these inconsistent state laws were mandatory existing legisla-
tion, necessary under the Twenty-First Amendment, and thus exempt from GATT
through the Protocol of Provisional Application. Id. para. 5.46-48.
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did the U.S. government sue the states to force compliance. On
the contrary, state and federal government officials are working in
an ongoing process to bring the laws into compliance with the
panel decision.'54
While the United States is working to implement the decisions
of this panel, one must recall that the new DSB will have en-
hanced powers to make and enforce its decisions. 5 Moreover,
members of the WTO, including the United States, have signed an
agreement that urges "[p]rompt compliance with recommendations
or rulings of the DSB [as] essential in order to ensure effective
resolution of disputes.' 5 6 Members that fail to comply with cov-
ered agreements or recommendations and rulings within a reason-
able time face payment of compensation or retaliation. 7 Oppo-
nents of the Uruguay Round seized upon these enhanced legal
powers as a serious threat to state sovereignty.
3. DSB Panels: A New Threat to States? This section will
show why opponents to the Uruguay Round could not sustain
arguments that the WTO will impermissibly violate state
sovereignty. As described above, the federal government
traditionally holds a preeminent position in international
commerce, and GATT clearly relates directly to international
commerce. Moreover, under the Uruguay Round implementing
legislation, several provisions protect states' limited but legitimate
interests. First, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act provides that
the President and the U.S. Trade Representative must consult with
the states about provisions of the Agreement that affect the
states.' 58 Therefore, the states will have input into measures that
affect their laws and can begin to limit any effects on state sover-
eignty at an early stage. More importantly, the Act provides that
the USTR and state government representatives will work together
to bring conflicting state laws into compliance with adverse panel
154. United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, Follow-up on
Panel Report, Communication from the United States, GATr Doc. DS23113 (Dec. 13,
1993) (explaining that states are continuing to adopt legislation in conformance with the
panel report).
155. See supra notes 60-62, 86-89 and accompanying text.
156. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 29, art. 21(1), 33 I.L.M. at 125.
157. Id. art. 22(1)-(3), 33 I.L.M. at 126-27.
158. Uruguay Act, supra note 14, § 102(b), 108 Stat. at 4815-16.
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decisions.159 Like the process followed in the Beer I case
discussed above, the federal government will not simply overturn
state law after an adverse panel decision, but will work with the
states to reach solutions that satisfy both GATT norms and state
sovereignty needs. Finally, the Act provides that adverse panel
decisions cannot automatically invalidate state law, but that the
United States must bring an action under congressional scrutiny
against a nonconforming state forcing it to comply.16° This
provision ensures that any state law that violates GAIT principles
will have judicial protection against arbitrary invalidation. Thus,
enhanced dispute settlement is coupled with federal responsibility
for bringing state law into compliance with adverse DSB panel
rulings to safeguard state sovereignty.
A principal argument against the Uruguay Round Agreements
claimed that binding decisions from the DSB would alter state
laws.6' with little regard for the state's policy goals and sover-
eignty. During the congressional debates, Professor Tribe ex-
plained,
[w]hereas Congress may choose between a GATT-illegal federal
law and WTO-imposed sanctions, a state whose law has been
found in violation of GATT provisions will know that if it does
not change its law, one of the following will occur: Congress may
preempt the offending state law; the Executive Branch may bring
an action against the state and persuade a court to strike the law
down under GAIT; or the nation as a whole will be subject to
retaliatory sanctions. If the state does not wish to change its law,
the consequences are left to federal officials and to other na-
tions."'
Thus, Professor Tribe argued that states will relinquish sovereign
legislative and executive powers to either the federal government
or simply to GATT panels.
Consumer groups argued that GATT would weaken state
consumer protection laws. Testifying before the Senate Commerce
Committee, consumer advocate Ralph Nader argued that foreign
countries would challenge state and local laws as illegal trade
159. Id. § 102(b)(C)(iv), 108 Stat. at 4817.
160. Id. § 102(b)(2), 108 Stat. at 4817-18.
161. Arguments also were made concerning the effect of the WTO on federal law.
However, this Note is limited to the issue of state sovereignty.
162. Tribe GATT Statement, supra note 131, at 303.
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barriers through the DSB, thus overturning important labor, envi-
ronmental, and consumer standards, and chilling further legislation
that potentially violated GAT norms.63 This result, he argued,
would subordinate domestic policies and domestic democratic bod-
ies to international mercantile interests and to "a dispute resolu-
tion body located in Geneva, Switzerland that would operate in
secret and without the guarantees of due process and citizen par-
ticipation found in domestic legislative bodies and courts."'"
State attorneys general also raised the sovereignty issue during
the Uruguay Round Agreement debates. 16 In a letter to the
President, forty-two state attorneys general expressed many con-
cerns, including whether the USTR will consult with the states
about state laws that are illegal under GATT; whether states will
have a formalized process and guaranteed right to defend their
laws from adverse DSB panel decisions; and whether the imple-
menting legislation would guarantee that the federal government
will genuinely consider trade sanctions rather than forcing states to
change their laws in response to an adverse panel decision."
Maine Attorney General Michael D. Carpenter summarized con-
cerns that the USTR would not protect state interests, stating that
"[the] USTR might view state laws as bargaining chips when nego-
tiating with trading partners, particularly because state laws in the
areas of health, safety and environmental protection often are
tougher than those at the federal level."' 67
Furthermore, Uruguay Round dissenters focused on a portion
of the Beer 11 decision that held a Minnesota tax incentive for in-
state microbreweries to be inconsistent with GAIT.'68 Critics saw
163. See GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings on S.2467 Before the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 357, 357-59 (Oct. 18,
1994) (prepared statement of Ralph Nader).
164. Id. at 359.
165. See Letter from Michael E. Carpenter, Maine Attorney General, et al. to Pres-
ident Clinton (July 13, 1994), reprinted in 140 CONG. REC. S8847, S8853 (daily ed. July
13, 1994).
166. Id.
167. Cloud, supra note 151, at 2010.
168. See Beer II, supra note 151, para. 5.19.
[Elven if Minnesota were to grant the tax credits on a non-discriminatory basis
to small breweries inside and outside the United States, imported beer from
large breweries would be "subject . . . to internal taxes . . . in excess of those
applied . . . to like domestic products" from small breweries and there would
still be an inconsistency with Article III:2, first sentence.
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the decision as the future of things to come under the WTO. Pro-
fessor Tribe argued that "an extreme version of the concept of
non-discrimination" found in the opinion "would limit states' abili-
ties to favor certain classes of producers, irrespective of nationali-
ty ... [and] would have much greater force if applied under the
WTO.' '169 Members of Congress raised similar concerns, fearing
that valid state laws would suffer immediate attack under the new
dispute settlement body.17 Senator Kempthorne provided a spe-
cific example of how panel determinations might affect his state's
laws: "[T]he Idaho legislature has enacted an investment tax credit
which allows companies to deduct plant investments. It is not hard
to imagine a WTO panel determining that this investment tax
credit favors Idaho industries over foreign competition.' 171
Dissenters, however, could not sustain these arguments be-
cause the nature of the Agreements and provisions in the imple-
menting legislation belied any real threat to state sovereignty.
Most importantly, substantive and procedural guarantees in the
implementing legislation will protect state sovereignty.17 Neither
the Agreements nor the implementing legislation allow immediate
invalidation of state laws in the face of adverse panel decisions.
On the contrary, as the Beer 1H decision illustrates, a process of
federal-state consultation will occur in order to find satisfactory
means to implement panel decisions. Moreover, foreign nations
will have strong incentives not to challenge state laws because such
attacks will open their laws up to attack from the United States,
and will foster animosity in trade relations between trading
partners.
As an ultimate guarantee of state sovereignty, the United
States may leave the WTO after six-months notice if it decides
that sovereignty has been compromised. 7 ' Moreover, Senator
Robert Dole expressed concerns about risks to U.S. sovereignty in
the WTO, but agreed to support the bill in exchange for legisla-
tion to be introduced in 1995 establishing a WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Review Commission. 7" This Commission, which will be
169. Tribe GATT Statement, supra note 131, at 306.
170. See Cloud, supra note 151, at 2009.
171. 140 CONG. REc. S15,271, S15,302 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Kempthorne).
172. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
173. WTO Agreement, supra note 15, art. 15(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1152.
174. See 140 CONG. REc. S15,271, S15,341 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1994) (statement of Sen.
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comprised of five sitting U.S. appellate court judges, will review
each DSB panel decision for fairness.'7 5 If the Commission finds
inequity in three or more decisions, Congress can take action to
remove the United States from the WTO.'7 6 While this enhanced
dispute settlement system will require greater compliance from
Members, procedural and substantive provisions in the WTO
Agreement and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act will effec-
tively safeguard state sovereignty.
B. NAFTA and the States
Canada, Mexico, and the United States established NAFTA to
increase productivity in its three Member nations by reducing
trade barriers. To achieve this goal, all parties recognized the need
for clear, reliable, and enforceable dispute settlement provisions.
However, as with GATT, enhanced powers to supranational bodies
may always affect state laws and the states' ability to promulgate
laws. This section will consider arguments that NAFTA
impermissibly violates state sovereignty. This section will also show
how NAFTA's structure overcomes these concerns.
1. NAFTA in U.S. Law. Like GATT, NAFTA was negotiat-
ed and approved as a congressional-executive agreement under fast
track procedures,'77 and as a valid congressional-executive
Dole) (citing Letter from Michael Kantor, United States Trade Representative to Bob
Dole, Senate Minority Leader (Nov. 23, 1994)). As agreed, Senator Dole introduced S.
Res. 16, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission
Act), 141 CONG. REC. S173, S176 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995).
175. The Commission will review adopted DSB panel decisions adverse to the United
States. The Commission will determine whether the panel or Appellate Body:
1. Demonstrably exceeded its authority or terms of reference or . . . [for dump-
ing cases] failed to apply Article 17.6 concerning standard of review;
2. Added to the obligations or diminished the rights the United States assumed
under the pertinent Uruguay Round agreement;
3. Acted arbitrarily or capriciously, engaged in misconduct, or demonstrably
departed from the procedures specified for panels or the Appellate Body in the
agreements; and whether
4. The action in 1, 2, or 3 materially affects the outcome of the report.
140 CONG. REc. at S15,341.
176. Id.; see also David E. Sanger, Dole and Clinton Strike Deal on World Trade
Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1994, at Al.
177. For a history of NAFTA fast track procedures, see Koh, supra note 122, at
153-56.
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agreement, it is also considered the supreme law- of the land.78
Because of its recent inception, few courts have considered
NAFTA directly, and the Supreme Court has never ruled on its
status as supreme law. In dicta, the Fifth Circuit explained: "In
sum then, the NAFTA Act is not meant to affect United States
law other than as 'specifically provided.'"' The court further
ruled that NAFTA did specifically amend § 17(d) of the Poultry
Products Inspection Act.18 Of course, this decision did not
address state law nor the application of an adverse panel decision.
However, the opinion does show that NAFTA supersedes specific
inconsistent federal law. By extension, inconsistent state law, which
can be preempted by federal law, must also yield to certain
NAFTA obligations.' 8'
Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania," a case that
arose under NAFTA's predecessor, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement (CFTA),183 provides some indication of how courts
may treat NAFTA because NAFTA borrows many of its provi-
sions directly from the CFTA. In this case, the court considered
whether the Pennsylvania Steel Products Procurement Act't 4 con-
flicted with and was therefore preempted by the CFTA.1' 5 The
court considered section 102 of the CFTA Implementation Act,
which provides that CFTA provisions "prevail over.., any con-
flicting State law... [and] any conflicting application of any State
law to any person or circumstance."' 6 However, because the
CFTA did not expressly mention "buy-American statutes," the
court held that the CFTA did not explicitly preempt these statutes,
but tacitly permitted them."8 The court also considered the legis-
lative history, opinions of Canadian commentators, and con-
gressional concerns about fair trade to decide that Congress could
178. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
179. Mississippi Poultry Ass'n, Inc. v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 303 (5th Cir. 1994).
180. Id. The PPIA is codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-70 (1988).
181. See Hudec, supra note 140, at 219.
182. 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
183. 27 I.L.M. 281. For indications of NAFTA's effect on the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, see United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449, § 501(c)(3), 102 Stat. 1851, 1898 (1988), reprinted in note
following 19 U.S.C.A. § 2112 (West Supp. 1994) ("suspension resulting from NAFTA").
184. Pub. L. 6, No. 3, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1881-87 (1978).
185. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 904-06.
186. Id. at 906. The North American Free Trade Agreement Act does not contain
similar language about preemption. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
187. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 907.
[Vol. 45:216
GATT & NAFTA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
not unilaterally eliminate these U.S. state laws while Canada main-
tained similar provincial barriers."
Because the caselaw is unclear concerning NAFTA's effect on
state laws, it is critical to consider the language of the North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act89 and its
legislative history.'90 Recall that NAFTA Article 105 requires
parties to ensure observance of its obligations by state and provin-
cial governments.' Like the Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
legislators took great care to protect state sovereignty from undue
intrusion by NAFTA panel decisions."g First, the Act specifically
states that state law cannot be declared invalid because it is incon-
sistent with NAFTA, except in an action brought by the United
States to declare the state law invalid. 93 At the same time, the
legislative history provides that "NAFTA obligations generally
apply to State and local, as well as Federal, laws and regulations,
with significant exceptions, particularly with respect to standards,
government procurement, investment, and trade in services."'94
These provisions leave some doubt about how and when NAFTA
will supersede specific state laws. However, the legislative history
also describes how NAFTA should function:
While section 102 makes clear that the Federal Government
retains the right to challenge, including through court action, any
State law or its application on the grounds that it is inconsistent
with the NAFTA, this authority is intended to be used only as a
last resort in the unlikely event that consistency is not achieved
through the consultative process. 195
So, great emphasis is placed on federal-state consultation to
bring state laws into conformity with NAFTA and to avoid federal
government challenges to inconsistent state laws. The consultative
188. Id. at 907 & n.4.
189. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3312-3473 (1995).
190. H.R. RP. No. 361, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2552.
191. NAFIA, supra note 6, art. 105, 32 I.L.M. at 298; see also supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
192. See, eg., Letter from Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, to Rep. Henry
A. Waxman, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health and the Environment (Sept. 7, 1993), re-
printed in 93 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2858, 2862 (responding to concerns that section 105 of
NAFTA would require preemption of state laws).
193. 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(2).
194. H.R. REP. No. 361, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 2568 (1993).
195. Id.
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process contains two elements. First, the President consults with
the states to ensure conformity of state laws through already es-
tablished policy advisory committees. 19 6 Second, the United
States Trade Representative also consults with the states about
"issues relating to the Agreement that directly relate to, or will
potentially have a direct impact on, the States."'" Legislators in-
cluded this expanded consultation process "to address concerns
expressed by State representatives about the potential impact of
NAFTA obligations on State laws and the need for their involve-
ment in any disputes concerning those laws."' 8 Finally, the im-
plementing legislation disallows private rights of action to chal-
lenge federal, state, or local laws.'99 This provision ensures states
that only the federal government may challenge, in court, a state
or local law for being inconsistent with NAFrA. Thus, these pro-
visions attempt to strike a balance between effective compliance
with United States international obligations and protection of
important state sovereignty interests.
2. Does NAFTA Violate State Sovereignty? Similar arguments
to those made against GATT2" arose against NAFTA during
congressional debates and hearings." 1 Representative Joelen Un-
soeld raised the question of environmental enforcement on the
House floor.' She included a memorandum of law from Profes-
sor Robert W. Benson of Loyola Law School that argued that
Article 105 of NAFTA would create implied and unavoidable
preemption of state and local laws. 3 Similarly, during questions
before the Senate Commerce Committee, Senator Stevens asked
United States Trade Representative Michael Kantor whether
Article 105 would require NAFTA's side agreements to preempt
196. 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(1)(A). These committees are established under 19 U.S.C. §
2114c(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
197. 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(1)(B).
198. H.R. REP. No. 361, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 2568.
199. 19 U.S.C. § 3312(c).
200. See supra notes 161-71 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, In America; NAFTA and the Elite, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
1993, at A27.
202. 139 CONG. REc. H9816, 9819 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Unsoeld).
203. Id. at 9820. Professor Benson also cited the Beer II case as evidence of challeng-
es to state laws that would require the federal government to force states to change con-
flicting laws. Id.
[Vol. 45:216
GATT & NAFTA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
U.S. law.2 Ambassador Kantor responded, "No, they do not.
What they do is they induce and force each of the participants to
enforce their existing laws.""0 5 Senator Stevens then raised his
chief concern: "Under the Supremacy Clause, it means suddenly
we have amended State laws whether the States like it or
not." Thus, as described above, members of Congress2 were
concerned that because NAFTA had the status of federal law it
would automatically preempt state laws.
A second major concern dealt with panel decisions. Professor
Benson also argued:
[C]onflicts between NAFTA and state and local laws will not
usually be resolved by American courts or agencies working
under open government requirements. They will usually be re-
solved by NAFTA arbitral panels of 5 trade specialists whose
proceedings and documents are secret. State and local officials,
represented only by U.S. federal officials, have no right to partic-
ipate to defend their laws. These panels may well declare state
and local laws in violation of NAFTA despite the presence of
the savings clause.
Professor Benson and others predicted that state pollution, labor,
food, consumer, and safety laws all faced challenges under
NAFTA as restrictions on trade.' Senator Kempthorne again
raised issues about Idaho's sovereignty under NAFTA's environ-
mental side agreement.210 He feared that the states would not
have adequate representation before arbitral panels, and that the
federal government would disregard legitimate differences in in-
terpretation of state laws by the states, passing panel penalties on
204. Hearings on the NAFTA Implementation Act Before the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (Oct. 21, 1993) (Senator Ted
Stevens questioned Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative: "[W]hat effect then do
these side agreements have as far as Federal law is concerned? Do they modify any
Federal law?").
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See also Letter from Michael Kantor to Rep. Waxman, supra note 192, at 2862
("Does [Article 105] require the U.S. to preempt any state and local laws, and does the
Administration intend to include any preemption provisions in its implementing legisla-
tion?").
208. 139 CONG. REc. at H9820.
209. Id at H9820-21.
210. 139 CONG. REc. S16,678, 16,696-97 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Kempthorne).
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to the offending state.2 ' In the House, Representative Bentley
also argued that citizens had no standing under "secret" Article 20
panel proceedings which further threatened sovereignty.2 2
Despite these concerns, the legislative history, expert opinions,
and final passage of NAFTA show that NAFTA will not
impermissibly infringe upon state sovereignty. First, the USTR
explained that NAFTA Article 105 did not require federal pre-
emption of inconsistent state laws. Rather, Article 105, like section
102(b)(2) of the Uruguay Round Implementation Act,21 3 will
hold the federal government responsible when states fail to comply
with NAFTA norms.214 Ambassador Kantor further explained
that "the precise legal relationship" between federal and state law
was left to each nation, and promised that the Administration
would work with Congress and the states to adopt an acceptable
standard.2 5 The compromise "acceptable standard" described
above216 does not include a provision that specifically requires
217preemption. Similar to the GAIT legislation, the NAFTA im-
plementing legislation also includes provisions guaranteeing feder-
al-state consultation to bring inconsistent state laws into conformi-
ty, which reserves recourse to preemptive legislation or legal action
as a last resort available only to the federal government.218 Thus,
211. Id.
212. 139 CONG. REc. H9800, H9800 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Bentley).
213. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
214. Letter from Michael Kantor to Rep. Waxman, supra note 192, at 2862.
215. Id. at 2862-63.
216. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
217. Unlike NAFTA, Title 1, section 102 of the United States-Canada Free-Trade
Agreement Implementation Act of 1988 required that to the extent there is any conflict
with state law, the provisions of the agreement "prevail over-(A) any conflicting State
law; and (B) any conflicting application of State law to any person or circumstance."
Pub. L. No. 100-449, tit. I, § 102(b), 102 Stat. 1851, 1853 (1988), reprinted in note fol-
lowing 19 U.S.C.A. § 2112 (West Supp. 1994).
218. Ambassador Kantor also wrote:
In the one instance where state measures were successfully challenged before a
GATT panel, we have not had recourse to preemption or lawsuits. Rather, we
have worked with the state involved to see what, if any, solutions to the ques-
tion can be found that would fully protect state interests in the matter. We ex-
pect our practice of consultations and cooperation to continue under the
NAFrA.
Letter from Michael Kantor to Rep. Waxman, supra note 192, at 2863. This letter further
illustrates the federal commitment to work with states to ensure compliance of state laws
with international trade obligations, dispelling fears that the federal government will sim-
ply invalidate state laws in response to adverse NAFTA or GATT panel decisions.
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the federal government will not run roughshod over state sover-
eignty, but will work with the states to ensure compliance with
national obligations.
Adverse panel decisions also pose no impermissible threat to
state sovereignty. The history of CFTA panel decisions shows that
the overwhelming majority have been quality decisions with "no
significant problems with compliance." '219 Thus, the likelihood of
numerous adverse panel decisions threatening state sovereignty
seems remote. In addition, there are numerous safeguards in both
the Chapter 19 and Chapter 20 panel processes, and in the imple-
menting legislation that protect state sovereignty. Speaking about
Chapter 19 panel decisions, one House Member described some of
the key safeguards: "All three signatories ... have the option to
refuse to alter laws that are found to be inconsistent .... If any
of the three sovereign countries refuse to change such a law...
the other countries can impose penalties or tariffs .... [A]ny of
the signatories can withdraw from the Agreement on 6 months
notice."'
Similarly, Chapter 20 panel decisions require federal govern-
ment action for implementation, and the government is bound by
a consultation process to ensure state participation in doing so.
Moreover, for Chapter 19 panels, section 403 of the Act imple-
ments safeguards from NAFTA Article 1904 (extraordinary chal-
lenge committees), 2 including an explicit guarantee that panels
will follow the domestic standard of review for the country whose
law is being challenged.'m Thus, if a state law is challenged as a
subsidy by Canada or Mexico, it will be guaranteed the same
standard of review that it would have under U.S. law. Finally,
these provisions, taken together, refute arguments that NAFTA
panel decisions will impermissibly violate state sovereignty by
compelling states to change laws inconsistent with NAFTA.
219. Huntington, supra note 24, at 415 (citing Gary N. Horlick & F. Amanda
DeBusk, Dispute Resolution Panels of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. The First
Two and One-half Years, 37 MCGILL LU. 575, 585-87 (1992)).
220. 139 CONG. REC. H9875, H10,019 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Fish).
221. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
222. H.R. REP. No. 361(I), supra note 190, at 74, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N., at
2624.
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CONCLUSION
The Uruguay Round Agreements of GATT and the North
American Free Trade Agreement are important international obli-
gations that will provide economic benefit to the United States
and the world. Enhanced dispute settlement procedures and firm
commitments to abide by the obligations in these agreements will
strengthen their credibility and effectiveness. In exchange for these
benefits, parties to the agreements have sacrificed a degree of
control over their domestic legal systems. While it is a constant
challenge to maintain an appropriate balance between the exigen-
cies of international trade obligations and the sovereignty of the
fifty states, GATT and NAIFTA have safeguard provisions to help
ensure a proper balance. Moreover, both agreements have specific
provisions that allow the United States to end its participation if
state sovereignty is undermined. While states and the federal gov-
ernment must be vigilant to protect states' rights under the agree-
ments, fears that the two agreements would necessarily usurp state
power are exaggerated and unpersuasive. NAFTA and the Uru-
guay Round Agreements of GATT effectively join the goals of
protecting state sovereignty and enhancing international trade.
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